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MENDING HOLES IN THE RULE OF 
(ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW† 
Evan J. Criddle* 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has witnessed a surge of interest in Carl Schmitt‘s 
controversial assertion that the rule of law inevitably bends under the de-
mands of state necessity during national emergencies.  According to 
Schmitt, legal norms cannot constrain sovereign discretion during emergen-
cies because ―the precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated.‖1  
The sovereign must therefore possess unfettered discretion to determine 
both ―whether there is an extreme emergency‖ and ―what must be done to 
eliminate it.‖2 
Few legal scholars have embraced Schmitt‘s theory of emergencies 
with the enthusiasm and sophistication of Adrian Vermeule, the John H. 
Watson, Jr. Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.  In an article pub-
lished recently in the Harvard Law Review, Vermeule argues that American 
administrative law is fundamentally ―Schmittian‖ in the sense that it per-
mits federal agencies to operate outside the constraints of administrative 
procedure and meaningful judicial review during emergencies.3  Vermeule 
contends that the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is replete 
with procedural exceptions, which generate ―black holes‖—zones where 
federal agencies are free to act outside the constraints of legal order.4  In 
addition, he suggests that federal courts manipulate flexible legal standards 
to accord heightened deference to federal agencies during national crises, 
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1
  CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 6 
(George Schwab trans., rev. ed., Univ. Chi. Press 2005) (1934). 
2
  Id. at 7. 
3
  Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2009). 
4
  Id. 
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transforming standards such as ―reasonableness‖5 and ―good cause‖6 into 
―grey holes‖—legal devices that preserve the façade, but not the reality, of 
the rule of law.7  Far from criticizing these gaps in federal administrative 
law, Vermeule accepts black and grey holes as institutional inevitabilities 
and dismisses proposals to extend the rule of law to all administrative ac-
tion as a ―hopeless fantasy.‖8   
Vermeule makes a compelling case for his observation that statutory 
loopholes and anemic judicial review have diminished administrative law‘s 
salience during national emergencies.  But his broader argument, that black 
holes and grey holes cannot be eradicated, is unpersuasive and deeply 
troubling.  In reality, Congress could eliminate the APA‘s procedural loo-
pholes without compromising agencies‘ capacity to act during emergencies 
if it would simply discard the APA‘s rule-based categorical exceptions in 
favor of a more nuanced, standard-based derogation regime.  Likewise, fed-
eral courts could easily eliminate grey holes by treating legal standards in 
administrative law as vehicles for promoting robust public justification of 
administrative action.  The primary obstacle to these reforms is not ―institu-
tional,‖ as Vermeule asserts, but rather cultural: too many legislators and 
judges view administrative law in static positivist terms as a means for allo-
cating decisionmaking authority among public institutions, rather than in 
dynamic relational terms as establishing a regime in which public officials 
must justify all exercises of administrative powers according to public-
regarding factors.   
To show how our administrative law might be reformed to promote a 
―culture of justification,‖9 this Essay advances a relational theory of the rule 
of law based on the principle that public officials and agencies serve as fi-
duciaries for the public.  Whereas Vermeule‘s article explores the current 
limits of our administrative law, the relational theory suggests practical 
steps for refining our legal system to ground emergency administration 
more firmly in the rule of law.   
I.   IS SCHMITTIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INEVITABLE? 
In defending his Schmittian theory of administrative law, Vermeule 
takes aim at legal scholars such as David Dyzenhaus who ―praise the rule of 
 
 
 
5
  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(holding that courts interpreting ambiguous federal statutes ―may not substitute [their] own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency‖). 
6
  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2006) (providing that agencies need not comply with the 
APA‘s provisions for informal rulemaking where ―the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest‖). 
7
  Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1096. 
8
  Id. at 1105. 
9
  See Etienne Mureinik, Emerging from Emergency: Human Rights in South Africa, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 1977, 1986 (1994) (book review) (characterizing South African law in the early 1990s as ―a strug-
gle between a culture of authority and a culture of justification‖). 
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law and aspire to extend law‘s empire to encompass even emergency poli-
cymaking by the executive.‖10  The aspiration to apply administrative law in 
emergencies is ―hopelessly utopian,‖ Vermeule argues, because Congress 
and the courts lack the institutional resolve necessary to subject the Execu-
tive Branch to the ―thick‖ rule of law.11  Although Vermeule concedes that 
―one could imagine a system of administrative law that is minimally 
Schmittian or even not Schmittian at all,‖12 he contends that such a system 
is not feasible in practice because Congress will never agree to close the 
APA‘s procedural loopholes and because courts will inevitably dial down 
the APA‘s flexible standards to maximize executive discretion in emergen-
cies.13  For these reasons, ―[t]he exception cannot, realistically, be banished 
from administrative law; exceptions are necessarily built into its fabric.‖14   
Few would dispute Vermeule‘s observation that the APA‘s procedural 
provisions are littered with loopholes, and I will not belabor this point.15  To 
the extent that the APA‘s categorical exceptions and definitional quirks 
punch holes in administrative law‘s fabric, thereby allowing public officials 
to operate outside the constraints of ordinary administrative procedure, 
Vermeule might be right to characterize our administrative law as Schmit-
tian in a minimalist sense.16   
Vermeule‘s more ambitious claim that black holes cannot be purged 
from our administrative law is less persuasive.  Even if we accept Verme-
ule‘s assertion that Congress lacks the requisite institutional incentives to 
impose ordinary procedural requirements on agencies during emergencies, 
it does not follow that Congress could not redesign the APA‘s emergency 
regime to eliminate black holes.  If ordinary administrative law is too bur-
densome, Congress could design malleable procedural requirements to ac-
commodate agencies‘ legitimate concerns for speed and efficiency without 
abandoning procedural restraints altogether during national crises.  Or Con-
 
 
 
10
  Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1101. 
11
  Id. at 1097.  Vermeule defines ―‗rule by law‘ (or the thin rule of law)‖ as ―compliance with what-
ever duly enacted positive laws there happen to be.  By contrast, the ‗rule of law‘ (or the thick rule of 
law) requires more than compliance with whatever duly enacted laws there happen to be; it also requires 
adherence to a broader set of principles of legality, most famously expressed by Lon Fuller.‖  Id. at 
1101.  
12
  Id. at 1105. 
13
  Id. at 1132–33. 
14
  Id. at 1104. 
15
  In most contexts, of course, federal agencies will be subject to constitutional constraints such as 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause—and thus will not fall entirely outside the rule of law—even 
when they operate within one of the APA‘s statutory loopholes.  Recognizing this fact, Vermeule does 
not argue that black holes are common, only that they exist and that their existence is inevitable.  Id. at 
1117–18. 
16
  Schmitt himself defends a much more aggressive theory of emergency administration, arguing 
that during emergencies the executive is sovereign and thus wields ―the highest, legally independent, 
underived power.‖  SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 17; see also id. at 9–12 (linking the concept of sovereign-
ty to article 48 of the German constitution of 1919, which granted emergency powers to the president). 
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gress could require agencies to develop their own ad hoc administrative 
procedures for emergencies, subject to broad congressional standards and 
judicial review.  Such measures would eliminate the procedural loopholes 
Vermeule identifies without sacrificing agencies‘ operational flexibility.  
The fact that such procedures do not currently exist reflects a lack of initia-
tive and imagination within the broader legal community rather than a fatal 
flaw in Congress‘s institutional structure.   
Just as Vermeule fails to demonstrate that Congress lacks the institu-
tional capacity to eliminate the APA‘s black holes, he does not make a per-
suasive case that federal courts are institutionally predestined to convert the 
APA‘s flexible standards into grey holes.  To be sure, experience suggests 
that federal judges on both sides of the political spectrum tend to accord 
administrative agencies heightened deference when applying flexible legal 
standards during emergencies.17  In most cases, however, heightened defe-
rence to public officials during national emergencies is consistent with the 
application of substantive legal standards such as ―reasonableness‖ and 
―good cause.‖  If the executive provides a reasonable justification for its 
approach to a crisis, judicial deference to that choice is a far cry from the 
type of de facto abstention that would render judicial review a farce.   
While this distinction between heightened judicial deference and de 
facto abstention is admittedly slippery, it is remarkable that virtually every 
case Vermeule cites in his discussion of grey holes follows a path of rea-
soned deference rather than de facto abstention.  Far from simply taking 
agencies‘ legal and factual assessments at face value, lower courts in the 
post-9/11 cases Vermeule identifies undertook a robust review of agency 
actions, identifying substantial evidence supporting the agencies‘ positions 
and articulating a detailed explanation for upholding the agencies‘ deci-
sions.18  None of these courts withheld meaningful review, generating the 
type of invidious grey holes that Dyzenhaus and others have criticized as 
anathema to the rule of law.   
Of course, one need not accept Vermeule‘s characterization of particu-
lar judicial decisions as ―grey holes‖ to appreciate the intense political pres-
sures federal judges experience as guardians of legal order during 
emergencies.  As long as our administrative law depends upon flexible legal 
standards, courts will be tempted to distort those standards during emergen-
cies in deference to the Executive Branch.  Eliminating black holes and 
placing greater reliance upon broad legal standards might only increase the 
opportunities and political pressures for judicial abstention, an insight 
 
 
 
17
  See, e.g., Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (―Surely we must recognize 
that courts are likely to accord a claim of military necessity greater deference during a major war than 
would be proper years later when the emergency is long past . . . .‖). 
18
  See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Jifry v. Fed. 
Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 
F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
104:1271 (2010)  Mending Holes  
 1275 
Vermeule attributes to Schmitt.19  In this respect, the Schmittian challenge 
to our administrative law will always be with us.  Yet numerous post-9/11 
decisions suggest that rigorous judicial review of agency action is not ―in-
stitutionally impossible‖20 and that the public need not necessarily resign it-
self to the inevitability of executive and judicial lawlessness during national 
crises.  The critical question is not whether black holes or grey holes are 
unavoidable (they are not), but rather how administrative law can best ad-
vance the rule of law project prospectively.   
While Vermeule endeavors to map the institutional limits of adminis-
trative law, in the end his article speaks most forcefully to the limits of posi-
tivist accounts of the rule of law.  For lawyers like Schmitt and Vermeule, 
who view administrative law in purely positivist terms, black and grey 
holes serve primarily to allocate legal authority among governmental insti-
tutions and are jurisprudentially problematic only insofar as their mechanics 
and systemic repercussions are poorly understood.21  This impoverished 
conception of administrative law lacks the resources necessary to explain 
what the rule of law is, or should be, in our republic.  To answer this ques-
tion, we need a more robust vision of the rule of law than Vermeule‘s 
Schmittian theory can supply.   
II. COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM REVISITED 
Vermeule properly identifies Dyzenhaus‘s account of ―common-law 
constitutionalism‖22 as the most rigorous alternative to Schmitt‘s emergency 
theory.  Dyzenhaus argues that law should govern emergency administra-
tion, and that the rule of law should be understood as ―a rule of fundamental 
constitutional principles which protect individuals from arbitrary action by 
the state.‖23  These principles include both procedural norms, such as the 
right to notice and a hearing before public power is wielded to affect private 
interests, and substantive values such as nonarbitrariness.  Such principles 
are ―constitutional‖ in the sense that they are constitutive of legal order it-
self, and are thus necessary for any legal system that claims to satisfy the 
rule of law.  Public officials and institutions cannot violate the rule of law‘s 
constitutive principles in emergencies without undermining their own 
 
 
 
19
  Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1135. 
20
  Id.  Curiously, Vermeule dismisses the jurisprudence of both the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Ninth Circuit as aberrational without seriously considering whether the more robust review performed in 
these courts undercuts the Schmittian account or might serve as a model for other federal courts in 
emergencies.  Id. at 1126, 1133–34.  
21
  Id. at 1143–49. 
22
  See DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 
(2006). 
23
  Id. at 2.  
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claims to moral and legal authority.24  Authority might make law, as positiv-
ists assert, but the rule of law‘s constraints make authority.25   
Public justification plays a central role in Dyzenhaus‘s common-law 
constitutionalism.  Building on the work of the late South African jurist 
Etienne Mureinik, Dyzenhaus argues that ―the constraints of legality are the 
constraints of adequate justification.‖26  The rule of law dictates that public 
officials provide reasons for their actions during emergencies and that these 
reasons be consistent with the fundamental principles of legal order.  
On this account, administrative law serves as the rule of law‘s handma-
id, laying the groundwork for meaningful public justification by cultivating 
governmental deliberation, transparency, fairness, reasonableness, and inte-
grity.  Traditional administrative procedures such as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking facilitate public justification by compelling agencies to articu-
late objectively reasonable, public-regarding justifications for their policy 
choices.27  Upon judicial review, agencies must also persuade courts that 
their actions have a reasonable legal and factual basis, and courts, in turn, 
must publicly justify their own rulings based on relevant legal principles.  
By ensuring that those who exercise public powers satisfy the rule of law‘s 
constraints, the practice of public justification serves as both the currency of 
public legitimacy and the guardian of legality within the administrative 
state.   
Critics have argued that Dyzenhaus‘s conception of the rule of law is 
too nebulous to guide public officials during emergencies.  In one recent ar-
ticle, for instance, Thomas Poole rejects Dyzenhaus‘s project as an ―exer-
cise in wish fulfillment.‖28  Although Poole admits feeling drawn to the idea 
that the common law contains ―deep, transcendental values,‖ he laments 
that ―when we look for [these values], we do not quite know where to find 
them.‖29  The common law tradition is a poor foundation for the rule of law, 
Poole argues, because ―[i]t is the capaciousness of common law, its norma-
tive ‗give,‘ that is paradigmatic, not the solid core of relatively unchanged 
normativity the common law constitutionalists imagine.‖30  In short, even if 
we accept Dyzenhaus‘s conception of the rule of law as a rule of reasons, 
the common law tradition arguably lacks the normative clarity needed to 
specify which reasons are adequate to justify state action.  
 
 
 
24
  See id. at 4–5. 
25
  Id. at 12. 
26
  David Dyzenhaus, Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture, 14 S. 
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 11, 30 (1998); see also Mureinik, supra note 9, at 1986 (describing ―the central 
aspiration of law‖ as the pursuit of ―ever-better justification of decisions‖). 
27
  See Dyzenhaus, supra note 26, at 35. 
28
  Thomas Poole, Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common Law, 7 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 247, 
266 (2009). 
29
  Id. 
30
  Id. at 268. 
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One promising approach for shoring up the normative foundations of 
common law constitutionalism focuses on the fiduciary character of public 
administration.31  By virtue of their legally entrusted authority, all public 
agencies and officials stand in a trust-like relationship toward persons sub-
ject to their administrative powers.  Just as the common law places trustees 
and other fiduciaries under legal obligations to honor their beneficiaries‘ le-
gitimate interests, those who wield powers of public administration likewise 
bear fiduciary obligations to treat their subjects fairly, reasonably, and non-
arbitrarily for public-regarding purposes.32  Where feasible, public adminis-
trators must also engage in deliberative decisionmaking, and they must be 
ready to provide reasons for their actions that are consistent with their fidu-
ciary role.33  These basic fiduciary obligations of public service are legal ob-
ligations because they are rooted in and constitutive of the state–subject 
fiduciary relation, and because fiduciary duties are legal duties.  
Fiduciary duties are legal duties within the common law not by histori-
cal accident but instead because, in Kantian terms, they embody persons‘ 
moral capacity to place state actors under legal obligations.  Evan Fox-
Decent and I have argued that Kant‘s legal conception of fiduciary relations 
offers a sound theoretical foundation for attributing fiduciary obligations to 
state actors.34  According to Kant, when parents unilaterally create a person 
utterly dependent upon them for survival, they also assume fiduciary obli-
gations to protect and care for their children.  Recognition of a child‘s equal 
freedom as a ―citizen of the world,‖ coupled with the child‘s practical or le-
gal inability to consent to the relationship of dependence, places parents 
under moral and legal duties to provide for their child‘s basic security by 
making ―the child content with his condition so far as they can.‖35  By the 
same reasoning, public officials bear fiduciary duties toward persons sub-
ject to their administrative powers because public powers are entrusted sole-
ly to the state by law, leaving the public vulnerable to the abuse of 
administrative power.  To ensure that such persons are not subject to domi-
nation or instrumentalization, the fiduciary principle dictates that all agents 
 
 
 
31
  See Evan Fox-Decent, Democratizing Common Law Constitutionalism, 55 MCGILL L.J. (forth-
coming 2010).  For an argument that U.S. administrative law reflects a fiduciary model of state legal au-
thority, see Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 
(2006).  For a general discussion of the fiduciary character of state legal authority, see Evan Fox-Decent, 
The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN‘S L.J. 259 (2005) [hereinafter Fox-Decent, 
State Legal Authority]. 
32
  See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency 
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010). 
33
  Id. 
34
  See id.; Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. 
INT‘L L. 331 (2009); Evan Fox-Decent, Is the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights?, 27 LAW 
& PHIL. 533 (2008); Fox-Decent, State Legal Authority, supra note 31.  
35
  IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 98–99 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).  
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and instrumentalities of the state bear legal obligations to discharge their re-
sponsibilities fairly and reasonably in the public interest.36  
This relational account of common law constitutionalism explains why 
the rule of law is a rule of reasons, and it clarifies what kinds of reasons 
count in public justification.  To satisfy the demands of legality on Kant‘s 
theory—establishing a regime of secure and equal freedom for all per-
sons—public officials must demonstrate that their actions are consistent 
with their fiduciary obligations and do not reflect domination or instrumen-
talization.  Where practicable, administrative agencies should employ deli-
berative decisionmaking procedures to minimize the risk of arbitrariness, 
and they should open their decisions to public contestation.  Even when 
such measures are not practical due to circumstances of extreme exigency, 
administrative agencies should justify their actions to the public and the 
courts, explaining how their actions are consistent with the fiduciary obliga-
tions of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and 
transparency.  All public officials must satisfy these principles if persons 
subject to their administrative powers are to be taken seriously as free and 
equal autonomous agents, not merely as objects of state domination or in-
strumentalization.  The relational fiduciary theory thus disarms Schmitt‘s 
critique of legal liberalism and Poole‘s critique of common law constitutio-
nalism and offers a blueprint for promoting the rule of law in emergencies.   
III. MENDING HOLES IN THE RULE OF (ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW 
By cataloguing the various Schmittian features of our administrative 
law, Vermeule indirectly outlines an agenda for common law constitutio-
nalism in the twenty-first century.  To establish the rule of law, legislators 
and judges must work together to mend the black holes and grey holes 
Vermeule identifies, developing new strategies to reconcile the demands of 
state necessity with the rule of law in emergencies.  
On the relational theory of common law constitutionalism, federal 
agencies must satisfy the rule of law in emergencies because arbitrary state 
action in emergencies undermines the fiduciary character of state legal au-
thority.  This does not necessarily mean that Congress and the courts must 
fill black holes with ordinary administrative procedure, as some commenta-
tors have suggested.37  Far from promoting the rule of law, slavish adhe-
rence to ordinary administrative procedures could compromise the state–
subject fiduciary relation by preventing agencies from acting swiftly and ef-
fectively to safeguard subjects‘ secure and equal freedom.  What the rela-
tional account of the rule of law does require, on the other hand, is that 
Congress and the courts establish a legal regime for emergencies that com-
 
 
 
36
  See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 34, at 347. 
37
  See Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 
56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 520–21 (2005); Peter Raven-Hansen, Detaining Combatants by Law or by Or-
der? The Rule of Lawmaking in the War on Terrorists, 64 LA. L. REV. 831 (2004). 
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pels federal agencies to justify their derogations from ordinary administra-
tive law—not by reference to crude categorical rules, but by reference to re-
lational principles such as necessity, proportionality, fairness, 
reasonableness, and transparency.  Such an approach would preserve ad-
ministrative flexibility during national crises while holding agencies to ac-
count for their fundamental fiduciary obligations.  
The APA‘s ―good cause‖ exception for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing provides a rudimentary model for the relational approach to administra-
tive procedure, but Congress and the courts should specify the principles 
that govern derogation from ordinary administrative procedure more clear-
ly.  For example, when agencies elect to abandon traditional notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures, the APA could require that they give the 
public contemporaneous notice, explaining why procedural derogation is 
necessary and why their preferred decisionmaking procedures are narrowly 
tailored to the perceived emergency.  Emergency regulations should also be 
accompanied by a public statement explaining how the agency‘s substantive 
regulation satisfies existing law, is proportional to the perceived emergency, 
and promotes the public interest.  Congress should also require agencies to 
subject emergency regulations to more robust deliberative procedures as 
soon as practicable after the crisis has passed, ensuring that emergency reg-
ulations adopted under conditions of uncertainty do not become ossified in 
ordinary administrative law.  In addition, Congress should expand federal 
courts‘ jurisdiction to ensure that they are able to consider whether agencies 
have satisfied their fiduciary obligations at each stage of the decisionmak-
ing process.  Within this new regime, courts could still accord substantial 
deference to an agency‘s assessment of an emergency and the agency‘s 
choice of means to address it, but the courts would nonetheless consider 
whether the agency‘s explanations are objectively reasonable and consistent 
with the state‘s fiduciary role.  Measures such as these would preserve the 
Executive Branch‘s ability to respond to emergencies quickly and effective-
ly without entrenching emergency regulations in ordinary administrative 
law or sacrificing the rule of law on the altar of state necessity.  Equally im-
portant, these reforms are fully within Congress‘s institutional capacity.   
The relational approach to emergency administration carries its own 
risks, of course.  If Congress were to develop a more sophisticated stan-
dard-based derogation regime for administrative procedure, it might elimi-
nate black holes only to find that judges distort those standards to create a 
new generation of grey holes.  If our administrative law were to draw on 
common law constitutionalism to reconcile emergency administration with 
the rule of law, courts might be tempted to preserve the status quo by refus-
ing to hold public officials accountable for abuses of power.  Even if courts 
did not consistently enforce the derogation regime with due rigor, however, 
the mere fact that agencies would bear a legal responsibility to justify their 
deviations from ordinary administrative procedure during emergencies 
would represent an important step toward the rule of law.   
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CONCLUSION 
Although grey holes are neither conceptually unavoidable nor institu-
tionally inevitable, they may be difficult to eradicate in practice because 
they reflect a powerful tradition within our legal culture that emphasizes the 
thin ―rule by law‖ rather than the thick ―rule of law.‖  Efforts to mend these 
holes expose a tension within our legal culture ―between lawyers who think 
that the job of law is done when decisions are made by officials wielding 
authority and lawyers who think that the law should strive for decisions that 
are justified.‖38  While positivist accounts of administrative law such as 
Vermeule‘s Schmittian theory permit the Executive Branch to take extra-
legal action during emergencies, the relational account espoused by Dyzen-
haus, Mureinik, and other common law constitutionalists ―lead[s] to a 
culture of justification—a culture in which every exercise of power is ex-
pected to be justified.‖39  The black and grey holes Vermeule identifies thus 
require more than technocratic legal reform; they call for a fundamental 
reorientation of our legal culture away from a focus on formal authority and 
toward a more vigorous practice of public justification.   
To be sure, the relational theory of common law constitutionalism is 
aspirational insofar as it relies on federal judges to apply legal standards as 
vehicles for promoting public justification.  Vermeule goes too far, howev-
er, when he characterizes the aspiration toward a culture of justification as 
―fantas[tical]‖ or ―hopelessly utopian.‖40  Guided by the fiduciary character 
of public administration, common law constitutionalism offers a practical, 
realistic roadmap for overcoming Vermeule‘s Schmittian challenge and sa-
feguarding the rule of (administrative) law during emergencies.   
 
 
 
38
  Mureinik, supra note 9, at 1983. 
39
  Dyzenhaus, supra note 26, at 11 (quoting Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the 
Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994)). 
40
  Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1097, 1105. 
